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2626th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 14 October 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Richard A. Woolcott (Australia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2626)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:

   (*a*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17618);

   (*b*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17619)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

(*a*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17618);

(*b*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17619)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a decision taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Seereekissoon (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a decision taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of that Council to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sinclair (Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a decision taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite Mr. Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Toivo ya Toivo took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2624th and 2625th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Cameroon, Canada, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Libya Arab Jamahiriya, Senegal, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Engo (Cameroon), Mr. Lewis (Canada), Mr. Oramas Oliva (Cuba), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Sarré (Senegal), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Bouziri (Tunisia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Ghana in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gbeho (Ghana) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 14 November 1985 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request the Council to permit me to participate, in my capacity as Chairman of the

Special Committee against *Apartheid*, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

7. On previous occasions the Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In conformity with past practice in this matter, I propose that the Council extend an invitation, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

It is so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

9. Mr. AZZAROUK (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): On behalf of the delegations of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and of the other members of the Group of Arab States, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for November. We are convinced that your experience and wisdom will enable the Council to achieve the best possible results this month.

10. In the same way, we cannot fail to convey our appreciation to your predecessor for the excellent way in which he guided the Council's work last month.

11. Once again the Council is meeting to consider the situation in Namibia, a question on which it has deliberated in the past and adopted many resolutions. It is an issue which has been discussed by the General Assembly ever since its first session in 1946 and on which it has adopted dozens of resolutions.

12. The present meetings of the Council are being held as the world's peoples commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

13. Despite those facts, the Pretoria régime persists in its attempts to circumvent the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia as endorsed in Council resolution 435 (1978). It is using every means at its disposal to ignore that resolution, which is the only internationally accepted formula for the settlement of the problem. The Pretoria régime continues its occupation of the Territory of Namibia and has set up a puppet government there, thus defying Council resolutions, particularly resolution 264 (1969), which calls for the immediate withdrawal of Pretoria's forces from the Territory of Namibia.

14. Pretoria also continues to defy General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 2145 (XXI), of 27 October 1966, which ended South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia.

15. Despite the fact that the so-called interim government is illegitimate and enjoys no international recognition, the Pretoria régime continues to defy the will of the international community with its delaying tactics, which are designed to enable it to consolidate the *fait accompli* and to ignore the legitimate demands of the Namibian people, under the leadership of its genuine representative (SWAPO), for the ending of occupation, the eradication of racial segregation and the attainment of freedom and independence.

16. Pretoria continues to take unilateral measures which the international community has declared in Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 566 (1985), to be illegal and null and void. Similarly, it is trying to impede the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in order to perpetuate its racist occupation of Namibia.

17. The majority of the States of the world understood years ago the purposes and the nature of the racist Pretoria régime and the methods of procrastination and prevarication it practices to prolong its occupation of Namibia and continue its exploitation and plunder of the wealth and resources of the Territory. We are fully aware that the relations of co-operation in every sphere linking the racist Pretoria régime and some Western régimes, with the racist Zionist entity in Palestine in the front rank, have enabled that régime to continue to defy and disregard the will of the international community, despite the numerous United Nations resolutions calling for an end to all dealings with the racist Pretoria régime.

18. We have all read the further report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/17442*], in which he informs the Council of a total lack of progress in his latest talks on this issue with the South African Government. In the face of Pretoria's determination not to respect Council resolutions and not to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), we can only reiterate yet again that the racist régime in South Africa will not end its occupation of the Territory of Namibia unless the Council adopts more comprehensive and effective measures. By that we mean the imposition against the South African Government of comprehensive sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, so as to secure from it a commitment to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on this subject.

19. We believe that, as we commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations and the signing of its Charter, the credibility and reputation of the Organization are experiencing a crisis of confidence as far as many peoples of the world are concerned, peoples that had pinned the highest hopes on the Organization. That is because of the lack of movement on this issue, which has been under discussion ever since the first session of the General Assembly.

20. We believe that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to restore the credibility and reputation of the

United Nations, which, since its creation, has made great strides in the field of decolonization.

21. Mr. BIERRING (Denmark): May I start by saying how pleased we are to see you, Sir, in the President's chair for this month. The very close relations, personal as well as professional, which have always existed between our Missions to the United Nations reflect the affinity of positions of our respective countries on most issues which come before the Organization, and thus also on the problem with which the Council is faced today. We wish you every success in discharging your heavy responsibilities.

22. I would also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, the representative of the United States, Mr. Vernon Walters, for the very efficient and good-humoured way in which he conducted our business last month, giving ample evidence that he is a seasoned hand in the noble art of diplomacy.

23. Last June, the Council held deliberations on the situation in Namibia and adopted resolution 566 (1985), which strongly warned South Africa that failure to co-operate in its implementation would compel the Council to meet forthwith to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations.

24. The Council's debate left no doubt that a consensus continues to exist in the international community on all the fundamental issues concerning Namibia's independence. It is agreed that the Council has a special responsibility for Namibia's independence, that an internationally acceptable solution must be based on the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and that the linking of the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues is incompatible with that resolution. The Council has unequivocally condemned the installation of a so-called interim government in Windhoek, in clear defiance of resolution 435 (1978), and declared it to be illegal, null and void. Both SWAPO and South Africa have accepted resolution 435 (1978).

25. We welcome the fact, although long overdue, that South Africa, in its letter to the Secretary-General dated 12 November 1985 [*S/17627*], has finally informed him of its choice of the electoral system, thus removing the last remaining obstacle to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Much to our regret, however, we have also noted that South Africa has again raised the question of impartiality. In this connection, we would like to recall that the agreement reached on this issue takes effect only after a date has been set for implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

26. The most discouraging aspect of the statement by South Africa's representative yesterday [*2624th meeting*] was, however, that he repeated South Africa's insistence on linking a clearly extraneous issue to Namibia's independence. Furthermore, while pretending to make efforts in good faith towards solving this artificial problem, South Africa makes sure that its solution becomes increasingly unobtainable. South Africa knows very well that its overt military support for UNITA [*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*] in Angola, as demonstrated most recently by the South African attack near Mavinga, will postpone rather than accelerate the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola.

27. The Council has in recent months been treated to lengthy dissertations on South Africa's perception of foreseeable developments in southern Africa. We have been told repeatedly by South Africa's representative that his country is the last line of defence of democratic values in the region and that the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in present circumstances would result in a government in an independent Namibia which would threaten South Africa's western border.

28. South Africa's argument totally lacks credibility and is an affront to knowledgeable persons who have followed post-colonial developments in southern Africa. An overwhelming majority of the world community clearly sees that South Africa's policy in the Namibia question and its repeated attacks on Angola in support of UNITA contribute more to the increase of outside involvement in the region than the mere presence of a certain number of Cuban forces in Angola for reasons irrelevant to the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence.

29. The policy of my Government is clear. We determinedly reject linkage. We believe that the Namibia question should be solved on its own merits and not be seen in an East-West context.

30. There is a growing feeling that developments in southern Africa represent an increasing threat to the stability of the region and have wider implications for international peace and security. We appeal to all parties concerned to make a determined effort to settle the issue of Namibia's independence in a peaceful way. This effort must be backed by pressure from the international community, but we hope that countries with particular leverage will bring their influence to bear on the parties and, not least, try to convince South Africa that its continued delaying tactics are not in its own long-term interest and will not be tolerated.

31. Meanwhile, the Council must live up to its special responsibility. It is the considered opinion of the Danish Government that the Council must continue and, as appropriate, step up the pressure on South Africa to pave the way for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

32. That pressure should, however, be brought to bear in unanimity. The adoption of resolution 566 (1985) marked an important step in this direction. It is our hope that this trend will continue and be strengthened, since experience has shown that a divided Council cannot effectively influence South Africa. It is thus of paramount importance that the Council act with consensus on this vital issue.

33. Mr. BASSOLE (Burkina Faso) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is pleased to see you, Sir, presiding over the Council this month. Your outstanding abilities as

a diplomat and your most helpful disposition give us the assurance that our work will have a successful outcome.

34. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Walters, the representative of the United States, our warm congratulations on the very competent manner in which he presided over the Council's work in a particularly heavy month.

35. In 1966, the United Nations decided to terminate South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. It thereby stripped South Africa of any right to administer that Territory. That decision was taken 20 years after the United Nations had first considered the question of Namibia. South Africa has thus been disregarding that decision for 20 years, because it has maintained and continues to maintain today its unlawful occupation of Namibia.

36. There is little need to list here the many initiatives taken by the Council or the many decisions it has adopted in the past 20 years to secure Namibia's independence. Such a historical review cannot, however, fail to highlight the decisive step towards an internationally acceptable solution represented by the adoption of resolution 435 (1978).

37. By that resolution the Council endorsed a clear and detailed plan for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. The plan provided for the assistance of the United Nations to that end.

38. Notwithstanding the many intensive efforts made to implement that plan, the Security Council has twice had to sound the alarm, expressing in its resolutions 532 (1983) and 539 (1983) grave concern at the slow progress in the matter.

39. And, as if to increase that concern, the racist Pretoria régime has erected one obstacle after another, thereby hampering the efforts being made in many quarters to accelerate Namibia's accession to independence and to put an end to the suffering of its people. At Geneva, in January 1981, in particular, Pretoria backed away from its own commitments, thus dashing the hopes that the ongoing talks had legitimately aroused.

40. We feel that it is fitting to refer again here to the fact that, during the same year, the Council was unable to adopt a draft resolution that had been submitted to it and that was designed to impose sanctions on South Africa. That failure is, as we know, to be blamed on three permanent members of the Council. Some movement has occurred in those countries since then, although it is still too timid and falls far short of what the international community expects of them.

41. The United Nations, and primarily the Security Council, has a unique role to play in upholding the interests of peoples, particularly those that continue to languish under the colonial yoke at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The Namibian people are one of those peoples that for almost 100 years have aspired to peace, justice, freedom and independence. This role is also a moral obligation which the permanent members of the Security Council, in particular, have the overriding duty to fulfil.

42. The Security Council is not a lordly mansion. We hope that those of its permanent members that have so misused their right of veto, thereby helping racist South Africa to avoid heeding reason, will at long last deign to open their eyes to see, their ears to hear, their minds to understand.

43. We continue to believe that South Africa, which oppresses its own people, in all logic cannot but oppress other peoples outside its territory. A régime that does not recognize the most elementary rights for the overwhelming majority of its own people because of the colour of their skin can clearly not recognize those same ritghts for other peoples of the same colour.

44. In his statement on 14 June in the Council [*2590th meeting*], the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Burkina Faso expressed the hope that each report of the Secretary-General on Namibia would henceforth be the subject of a meeting of the Council, in the course of which the Council, drawing appropriate conclusions from the report, would take the initiative and promote further action to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and thereby bring about progress towards the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

45. Moreover, in resolution 566 (1985), the Council strongly warned South Africa that its failure to co-operate would compel the Council to meet forthwith to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII, as additional pressure to ensure South Africa's compliance with the resolutions mentioned in the sixth preambular paragraph of that resolution. Resolution 566 (1985) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. That result is, in our opinion, clear evidence of a consensus that has come about in the Council. It is also evidence of the determination of all the members of the Council to take a decisive step.

46. Logically, the fact that the Council is meeting today—pursuant to the very instructive report of the Secretary-General and at the request of the representatives of India and Mauritius in their capacity of, respectively, Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and Chairman of the Group of African States at the United Nations—is unmistakable proof that South Africa, notwithstanding that warning and the firmness with which it was made, has refused to co-operate.

47. Consequently, it is clear that the Council, if it does not wish to lose its credibility, must act, and act in keeping with resolution 566 (1985). It is all the more important for it to act because the situation in South Africa has greatly deteriorated in the past five months. It must act in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter. And, finally, it must apply Chapter VII of the Charter.

48. The increasingly intense campaign that has been conducted throughout the world against the racist Pretoria régime in a concerted effort to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia and to *apartheid* makes it essential that we should now, more than ever before, show firmness and intransigence in our deliberations and decisions.

49. The veto right and the abuse and unjust use of that right in the particular case of Namibia, and in other cases as well, will not be able to silence for ever the rising clamour, which we too are now hearing, from an international community that yearns for peace, justice, equality, freedom and independence.

50. Nothing more can be hoped for from the racist régime of South Africa. It has taken advantage for too long of the complicity and culpable support of certain permanent members of the Security Council. It is those members in particular that we now invite to join the international community once again, after having strayed from it so many times.

51. My country, Burkina Faso, believes deeply in the progress of history, history which invariably assures peoples struggling for peace, justice, freedom and independence of certain victory. We draw from our unshakeable faith the solid conviction that in Namibia independence is inevitable and that in southern Africa, in general, freedom and justice will eventually triumph.

52. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): As you well know, Mr. President, it gives my country the greatest pleasure when we do from time to time beat Australia at cricket. By the same token, we regard it as no disgrace to be beaten by Australia. It is an honour for me personally, as for any British Ambassador, to sit under the captaincy of an Australian skipper, even though you have got the wrong numbers on your team.

53. The pleasure that we had from the able captaincy of Mr. Walters was increased by the fact that he, too—unusual among United States ambassadors—is a cricket player, a man of many parts and great talents. We are grateful for his presidency.

54. My cricket metaphor is not without political purpose. I think that this debate is an occasion on which the Council can act as a united team. We are, so to speak, all on the same side of the table; we have the South African problem on the other side of the table to contend with.

55. This being so, I believe that we need to demonstrate our unity of view and to illustrate practically our solidarity in action. The speech we have just heard from the representative of Denmark was statesmanlike. It was a speech with which I found myself wholly in agreement, and I hope that the South African delegation and the South African Government will take it to heart. They should understand that when we are talking here this afternoon we are not just taking part in a ritualistic, pro forma, boring United Nations exercise. We are involved in something that really matters and in a project where we are determined to achieve a change in circumstances, and soon.

56. The representative of Denmark said a few minutes ago that the delaying tactics which the South African Government is employing are not in South Africa's own best interests. I am sure he is right, and I wish that the South Africans would open their ears to that and reconsider what their own best interests are. I am convinced that it would be very much to their interests, as well as to the legitimate interests of the people of Namibia, that South Africa should implement Council resolution 435 (1978) forthwith.

57. My Government's approach to the Namibian problem is well known and is similar to that of many other Members of the United Nations. It has two essential elements.

58. First, our objective is to see Namibia achieve internationally recognized independence at the earliest time and by the most peaceful means. To this end, we joined with the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in formulating the United Nations settlement proposal, a plan adopted with the support of all but two members of the Council in resolution 435 (1978). Like the other authors of the contact group's plan, we have repudiated any attempt to circumvent resolution 435 (1978) through an internal settlement. Resolution 435 (1978) remains the only internationally accepted basis for a Namibian settlement. As such, it is something that the Council should be careful to preserve.

59. Secondly, we have joined not only with our contact group partners but with wider groups of United Nations Members in seeking to co-ordinate efforts to promote rapid and peaceful change in South Africa—indeed, in southern Africa—including the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As I explained in my statement in the General Assembly on 29 October,[1] we have formulated a strategy which combines pressure and persuasion.

60. With regard to Namibia, South Africa must be persuaded that there is no future in a policy of clinging to the Territory or delaying the implementation of the settlement plan in defiance of the unanimous views of the membership of the United Nations. South Africa must be persuaded that it is in its own best interests, as well as those of all the people of Namibia, to co-operate in bringing Namibia to independence at once. South Africa must understand that the so-called linkage theory is not acceptable to my Government, nor, I believe, to the Council.

61. I would have liked to have been able to greet the South African Government's long-awaited decision on the electoral system it prefers as evidence that it will now begin to implement the settlement plan. I do indeed welcome the decision. But I am all the more disappointed that it should have been coupled with an uncompromising reiteration of South Africa's reasons for not implementing a plan that is now complete.

62. I take particular exception, since it concerns the work of the contact group, to the suggestion that South Africa is setting a pre-condition concerning impartiality. I would remind the South African representative that this question

was resolved satisfactorily some three years ago. I would remind him further that my Government, and I am sure this goes for our contact group partners as well, and for the Secretary-General, will carry out scrupulously the arrangements into which we entered, and that the onus rests with South Africa to begin the implementation process, whereupon these agreements and arrangements can take effect.

63. In his statement yesterday [*2624th meeting*], the representative of South Africa laid much stress on the question of impartiality and, in this context, referred to the request addressed to you, Mr. President, by six political parties within Namibia. He asked the Council, in the interests of impartiality, to take prompt action on the request of those parties to participate in the present debate. I would refer the representative of South Africa to the enclosure to his letter of 12 November 1985 to the Secretary-General, the penultimate paragraph of which states the following:

> "The National Assembly of the Government of National Unity resolved, in a motion adopted unanimously on 19 June 1985, to request the Security Council formally to permit a representative of the Transitional Government to address the Council during its then-current debate on the independence of South West Africa. Inasmuch as the Council will be meeting again soon to consider the report of the Secretary-General, dated 6 September 1985, the Cabinet now formally wishes to request that representatives of the parties constituting the Transitional Government be permitted to address the Council on this occasion." [*See S/17627, annex.*]

64. The message addressed to you, Mr. President, did not describe the six parties as the "Transitional Government", nor did the South African representative tell the Council yesterday that those representatives wish to participate on behalf of the so-called Transitional Government. That was a strange omission. However, their intentions and purported status seem entirely clear from the passages I have just quoted.

65. My Government has supported requests from the representatives of different groups within Namibia to be invited to address the Council under rule 39. I would refer, for example, to the letter which I signed jointly with the representatives of France and the United States on 26 May 1983 [*S/15792*]. But we, for our part, cannot endorse any attempt to accord recognition or status to the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity. Like other members of the Council, we regard this so-called government as having no validity.

66. As it is clear that those who have applied for a hearing intend to speak in that capacity, we cannot endorse their request. Needless to say, our view on applications from competent persons remains as set in our letter of 26 May 1983, and we think it essential that equal treatment should be given to all political parties when implementation of the settlement plan commences. This, *inter alia*, will mean that no parties will be able to pass themselves off as the representatives of a "Transitional Government". So much for impartiality.

67. In the face of South Africa's present attitude, we must clearly reinforce our efforts at persuasion with pressure calculated to assist our objective and to underline our determination.

68. The United Kingdom is therefore participating with its partners in the European Community and in the Commonwealth in a strategic approach to the problems of southern Africa.

69. My Government, your Government, Sir, and other Governments closely involved in this debate played leading parts in crafting the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, adopted by the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States at their meeting held at Nassau from 16 to 22 October 1985. The opening words of the Accord are the following:

> "We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle *apartheid*, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore."[2]

70. Furthermore, the Communiqué also issued at Nassau by the Commonwealth Heads of Government[2] declared the establishment of the so-called interim administration null and void and rejected attempts to delay Namibia's freedom by linking it to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

71. As part of their strategic approach, the members of the Commonwealth agreed to adopt a number of economic measures against South Africa and decided to review progress after six months. The Commonwealth commended that approach to other Governments. It was agreed that Commonwealth members would pursue the objectives of the Accord in all the ways and through all appropriate forums open to them, in the belief that the joint pursuit of that programme would enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and of peace and stability in the southern African region as a whole.

72. It is entirely right that the Council should once again address itself to the Namibian problem. I acknowledge that the four of us who belong to the Commonwealth are in a minority within the Council. Nevertheless, I hope that our colleagues from other countries will see the merits of a strategy which enjoys the backing of 46 Governments from all parts of the world and that they will assist us in conveying to South Africa a unanimous message of firm and consistent persuasion and pressure. The best way of achieving this would be the adoption of a resolution consistent with the Commonwealth Accord. The South Africans must understand that we mean it when we insist that Namibia must gain its independence without delay.

73. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to

begin, Sir, by congratulating you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council. There can be no doubt that you will carry out the functions of President effectively and thoroughly.

74. We wish also to pay tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Walters, of the United States, who discharged his duties last month most successfully.

75. The liberation of Namibia from the racist colonialism of South Africa has for many years been one of the primary tasks of the United Nations.

76. Twenty years ago, the United Nations abolished South Africa's mandate for the administration of Namibia and demanded that it free that country unconditionally by granting independence to the Namibian people.

77. Throughout these 20 years, the people of Namibia under the leadership of its vanguard and sole legitimate representative, SWAPO, has waged, and continues to wage, a heroic struggle for freedom and against the South African colonialists. That struggle has enjoyed the broad support of all those who advocate the definitive eradication of colonialism in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*], the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of which by the General Assembly was celebrated this year.

78. During all those years, the United Nations—the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples—has repeatedly and resolutely condemned the policy of the Pretoria régime in respect of Namibia and has emphatically demanded the liberation of the people of Namibia and the granting of independence to them. The United Nations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and many other international forums have at the same time confirmed the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people by the use of all means available to them and have called for all possible assistance to be given to them for the elimination of the colonial occupation.

79. At the same time, during all those years, South Africa, protected by the Western Powers, has disregarded those demands of the United Nations and world public opinion and has continued its colonial war against the Namibian people, unceasingly carrying out large-scale acts of aggression against Angola and other neighbouring independent countries.

80. Unfortunately, all this is continuing today.

81. Over the last seven years, South Africa has sabotaged the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), which endorsed a plan for the peaceful transition of Namibia to independence, and now Pretoria is again trying to gain time for continuing its colonial exploitation of Namibia. In its manoeuvring to delay a political solution to the question of Namibian independence, it is clear that there has long been a precise division of roles. Pretoria puts forward certain types of fabricated pretexts, preconditions and other obstacles in order to refuse to implement the decisions of the Council, while the United States and certain other Western Powers defend the racist régime from effective international sanctions and try to secure new concessions from the Africans.

82. Such "constructive engagement" has one precise goal common to all those involved in it: that of imposing on the Africans a neo-colonialist solution of the problem of Namibia and of southern Africa as a whole.

83. It is precisely for that purpose that the colonial administration in Pretoria has concocted from the puppet Namibian parties a so-called transitional government of Namibia.

84. Now South Africa is obliged to manoeuvre, and it tries to give the impression that it is replying to yet another unresolved issue, namely, the question of the electoral system in Namibia. But it is clear that this is yet another smoke-screen because, at the same time, Pretoria is trying to blackmail the United Nations by demanding from it the renunciation of support for and recognition of SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Those tactics on the part of the Pretoria régime are quite unacceptable.

85. Last June, in resolution 566 (1985), the Council condemned the Pretoria régime for having set up in Windhoek a so-called interim government. It declared that step to be unlawful and null and void and to constitute a direct affront to the Council and blatant disregard of the Council's resolutions. None the less, the representative of South Africa was so bold as to come here and once again go on and on about the puppet henchmen in Windhoek. Does this suggest a serious approach on the part of the Pretoria authorities to a settlement of the Namibian problem?

86. Apart from anything else, no one has so far heard from South Africa a renunciation of the notorious "linkage" which has been advanced by it and the United States as a prior condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) concerning a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

87. Our delegation has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly to the fact that this notorious "linkage" is nothing other than a conspiracy between Pretoria and Washington, designed not only to hamper the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) but also, and simultaneously, to weaken the People's Republic of Angola by restricting its sovereign right to self-defence, which it enjoys under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

88. It is no mere coincidence that precisely now, when South Africa is inflicting one aggressive strike after another on Angola, trying to save its puppet bands of Savimbi from collapse, the United States Senate has repealed the so-called Clark Amendment which restricted United States aid to Savimbi. This opens the way to height-

ened interference in the internal affairs of Angola. These co-ordinated actions are also an integral part of the policy of constructive engagement.

89. It is also appropriate to point out that attempts to link the Namibian settlement to extraneous issues have been condemned and unconditionally repudiated by the Security Council and the General Assembly and by the Non-Aligned Movement, the OAU and other important international forums.

90. The entire world community calls upon the Western Powers to put an end to their support of the racist régime of Pretoria and stop trying to placate the aggressor to the detriment of the interests of the people of Namibia and of Angola and other neighbouring States and also of the majority of the population of South Africa itself.

91. It is high time to take resolute measures and have the Council adopt comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa, sanctions which would compel it to liberate Namibia and refrain from attempts to establish its neo-colonialist hegemony throughout southern Africa.

92. Yesterday, like today, this demand has been heard with renewed force in the Council in the statements of the representatives of African and other non-aligned countries.

93. In its decision adopted in June [*resolution 566 (1985)*], the Council resolutely warned South Africa that should Pretoria continue to refuse to carry out the Council's decisions calling for the granting of independence to Namibia, it would consider adopting appropriate measures under the Charter, including Chapter VII, in order to ensure that South Africa implements the Council's resolutions.

94. The adoption of such decisive measures is long overdue. The United Nations and, particularly, the Security Council bear direct responsibility for guaranteeing the attainment of genuine independence by Namibia. It is the Council's duty to overcome the obstacles to the liberation of Namibia, artificially piled up by Pretoria and its accomplices, and to achieve the prompt elimination of that hotbed of colonialism in southern Africa.

95. Those who are stubbornly impeding the process of the liberation and independence of Namibia are covering up their ignoble acts by propagandistic hullabaloo, to the effect that the conflict in southern Africa, in particular, the Namibian problem, is a reflection of East-West confrontation. But hardly anyone is likely to be fooled by such propaganda any more. The African peoples realize full well that the problem of Namibia is a problem of decolonization. For that reason, the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September, unambiguously repudiated all manoeuvres designed to distract attention from the central issue of the decolonization of Namibia by invoking East-West confrontation.

96. As was stated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, on 1 November last, at his meeting with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administration Council of socialist Ethiopia, Mr. Mengistu Haile Mariam:

> "The Soviet Union opposes the transformation of Africa into an arena of confrontations of any sort, not to mention military confrontation. We consider that only the peoples of Africa are entitled to determine the future of their continent and freely to choose the way in which their States are to develop. No one must interfere in their internal affairs and impose systems alien to them. Africa is not at all the periphery of the developed capitalist countries, as some have been accustomed to think since colonial times. The Soviet Union builds its relations with the African countries on complete equality and strict respect for their independence, equality of rights and support for the struggle of those countries against the neo-colonialist policy of imperialism."

97. The position of my country on the question of Namibia is well known. The Soviet Union advocates the prompt exercise by the Namibian people of their inalienable right to genuine self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands. We also advocate the prompt and complete withdrawal from Namibia of South African troops and the South African Administration, and we advocate the transfer of full powers to the people of Namibia in the person of SWAPO, which has been recognized by the United Nations and the OAU as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

98. The Soviet Union, as in the past, will continue to give full support to the just struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, a struggle which it is waging to secure its liberation by all the means available to it. As is well known, this is fully in conformity with United Nations decisions.

99. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that the Soviet Union advocates a political solution to the Namibian problem, the prompt implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and other basic resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We are prepared to make our contribution to that end. We actively support the application of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, precisely because we consider this to be the shortest route to a comprehensive political settlement of the problem.

100. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Joseph N. Garba, Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

101. Mr. GARBA (Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*): On behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, I wish first to express our gratitude to the members of the Council for the opportunity given to us to participate in the consideration of the question of Na-

mibia. I wish also to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I am confident that you will acquit yourself creditably in the discharge of the enormous responsibility entrusted to you. My congratulations go also to the representative of the United States, Mr. Vernon Walters, for the able and efficient manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Council last month.

102. As has happened on countless occasions, the Council is called upon once more to review the stalemate in the efforts to bring about independence for Namibia. It was only five months ago, in June, that the Council met to consider the same question at the request of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of African States. In the course of an exhaustive debate, the Council heard demands for the adoption of appropriate measures to compel the racist régime in Pretoria to honour the decisions of the Council. The demands at that time came not only from among the non-aligned and Eastern bloc countries, which have for a long time advocated such a course of action, but, significantly and for the first time, from members of the Western bloc, which added their voices to this call. This was to underscore the growing frustration at the behaviour of the pariah racist régime.

103. The Council, in response to this universal demand, adopted resolution 566 (1985), which, *inter alia*, condemned the racist régime for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, in flagrant defiance of the United Nations, and for its installation of a so-called interim government, which the Council appropriately declared illegal and null and void.

104. A more significant aspect of resolution 566 (1985) was the Council's threat to the racist régime that failure to implement it would compel the Council to meet forthwith to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII, as additional pressure to ensure South Africa's compliance with United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

105. As an interim measure, the Council urged States Members of the United Nations to take certain specific measures, as outlined in paragraph 14 of resolution 566 (1985). The Secretary-General has since issued his report on the implementation of that resolution [*S/17442*]. It is sad to note that, as reported by the Secretary-General, the racist Pretoria régime will still not co-operate with him to ensure the implementation of the Council's decisions on this question. That is not surprising, as South Africa's record on this issue is replete with broken promises, outright defiance and pretexts, and sheer refusal to co-operate in implementing the decisions of the United Nations.

106. South Africa's pretext continues to be insistence on the so-called linkage or parallelism with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from the People's Republic of Angola and the implementation of the United Nations plan as endorsed in Council resolution 435 (1978). This preposterous insistence continues despite its repeated rejection by the Council as totally irrelevant and extraneous.

107. It is a matter of grave concern that one State, supported by a permanent member of the Council, should continue to defy with absolute impunity the will of the international community.

108. It is undignified hypocrisy that those that have arrogated to themselves the role of defending democracy, freedom and liberty should turn out to be the staunchest allies of the Pretoria régime even when that régime is bent on destroying the most sacrosanct tenets upon which their own societies were built.

109. The continued occupation of Namibia, the exploitation of its natural and human resources and the subjugation of its peoples, as well as the denial of their most fundamental human rights, must cease forthwith. The use by Pretoria of the territory of Namibia as a springboard from which it perpetrates unprovoked acts of aggression against the independent African States must similarly be stopped, for it is a direct threat to the peace and security of the region.

110. The Council must rededicate itself to the noble goal for which it was created 40 years ago—that of ensuring the peace and security of the world.

111. It is now more than ever time for the Council to draw the line for the racist régime. It cannot be allowed further to defy the international community without serious repercussions. It is abundantly clear that the régime has no intention of abiding by the decisions of the Council. The time has therefore come for the Council to carry out the threat contained in its resolution 566 (1985). The effectiveness of the Council and the political will of its members are on trial at this time. To be taken seriously, the Council must not be seen to be making empty threats.

112. We in the Special Committee against *Apartheid* would like to associate ourselves with those who are demanding that the Council fully invoke the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The prevailing situation inside South Africa itself is graver and requires such a measure. The argument that sanctions are not effective is no longer relevant. Those who still advance such arguments do so only in their own selfish interests.

113. The PRESIDENT: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Australia.

114. First, I should like to pay a tribute to my predecessor, Mr. Walters, for the effective, efficient and good-humoured manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during October.

115. The Australian Government regards South Africa's continuing obstruction of Namibia's independence as an affront to the Council and to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

116. International attention has this year been focused, understandably, on the situation in South Africa itself and the tragic consequences of *apartheid*. But this justified

emphasis on the evils of *apartheid* and on the deteriorating situation in South Africa itself must not be at the expense of our continuing emphasis on the essential need to insist on the earliest possible implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and on the rightful independence of Namibia. It is timely, therefore, that the Council should meet once again to discuss Namibia.

117. My Government wishes to reaffirm unequivocally its strong support for the United Nations plan as endorsed in resolution 435 (1978).

118. Last June, the Council conducted a full debate on the situation in Namibia which culminated in the adoption of resolution 566 (1985). That resolution condemned South Africa for its obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and for its installation of a so-called interim government in Windhoek. It also mandated the Secretary-General to resume contact with South Africa on the remaining issues for the implementation of the United Nations plan, namely, the choice of the electoral system.

119. We have before us now the Secretary-General's latest report [*ibid.*]. My delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the Secretary-General for his efforts. We fully support his concluding remarks that the continuing delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan further erodes the credibility of the South African Government at the very time when the world is watching with growing anxiety the increasingly tragic developments occurring in that area.

120. My delegation has noted the most recent communication from the representative of South Africa [*S/17627*], dated 12 November 1985, containing the text of a letter from the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs about the choice of an electoral system. We heard the statement of the representative of South Africa in the Council yesterday [*2624th meeting*]. My colleague from the United Kingdom has just made some telling points on the matter of impartiality. I should like to add that, to the limited extent that the South African Government has accepted responsibility for deciding upon a system of proportional representation as a framework for elections which should lead to the independence of Namibia, we welcome it. But it is heavily qualified and attempts to establish the legitimacy of the so-called transitional government of national unity, a body which the Council and the Australian Government have refused to acknowledge as having any legitimacy. This is not the display of statesmanship and wisdom for which the Secretary-General appealed in his latest report.

121. The so-called transitional government of national unity also indicated in its statement issued on 12 November [*S/17627, annex*], that the Security Council "hampers rather than promotes" the achievement of the independence of Namibia. This is quite false. It is the South African Government which is hampering—obstructing would be a more accurate description—the long-delayed but inevitable independence of Namibia. Moreover, in his statement the representative of South Africa made it abundantly clear once again that even if agreement could be reached on the modalities for implementing the United Nations plan, this would still be conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The Australian Government rejects the linkage of these two issues. The independence of Namibia is one issue. The question of Cuban troops in Angola is another, quite separate, issue.

122. Faced with South Africa's continuing intransigence over the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the international community has turned to consideration of a variety of measures, including sanctions, aimed at bringing South Africa to live up to its obligations under that resolution. In resolution 566 (1985) the Council urged States Members of the United Nations that had not done so to consider taking appropriate voluntary measures against South Africa. The Australian Government has already introduced a number of such measures in line with its conviction that, pending the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions, the international community has an obligation to demonstrate to the South African Government in a clear and concrete manner its opposition to the policies which that Government pursues.

123. For its part, Australia has prohibited all new investment in South Africa by the Government and public authorities, except for that which is necessary to maintain diplomatic and consular representation in that country. It has prohibited any further direct investment in Australia by the South African Government or its authorities. It has asked all Australian financial institutions to suspend new loans to borrowers in South Africa, directly or indirectly. It has withdrawn the Australian Trade Commissioner from Johannesburg. It has withdrawn various forms of official Government assistance for Australians trading in South Africa. It has banned exports to South Africa of petroleum and petroleum products, computer hardware and any other products known to be of use to South Africa's security forces.

124. It has prohibited the import from South Africa of krugerrand and all other coins minted there, as well as of all arms, ammunition and military vehicles. It has placed an embargo on all new Government contractual dealings with majority-owned South African companies for contracts worth more than $20,000. It has decided to avoid Government procurement of supplies from South African sources, except such procurement as would be necessary to maintain diplomatic and consular representation in South Africa. And it has also decided to restrict Government sales of goods and services to South Africa.

125. It is introducing a code of conduct for Australian companies operating in South Africa which seeks to ensure that they do not attempt to exploit the particular circumstances inherent in *apartheid*. The code, for example, proposes that there should be no racial segregation at the workplace and that, as in Australia, there should be racial equality in such areas as recruitment, employment, wages, training and promotion.

126. During the Council's consideration of the situation in South Africa and Namibia earlier this year, Australia made clear its willingness to support the imposition of

comprehensive economic sanctions to bring about an end to *apartheid*.

127. The Australian Government welcomes the fact that the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States adopted unanimously the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa at their meeting held at Nassau from 16 to 22 October last. A copy of the Accord, together with a copy of the Communiqué adopted by the heads of Government, has been distributed as a document of the General Assembly.[2] But since the majority of the members of the Council are not members of the Commonwealth, I should like to set out briefly the main elements of that Accord.

128. It calls upon the authorities in Pretoria to declare that the system of *apartheid* will be dismantled and that specific and meaningful action will be taken in fulfilment of that objective, and it sets out a phased programme of economic measures to be implemented against South Africa to induce it to abandon *apartheid*.

129. Commonwealth leaders also specifically agreed that the action which they envisaged in the Accord should be directed equally towards ensuring South Africa's compliance with the wishes of the international community on the question of Namibia.

130. Several measures are to be adopted immediately by countries which are members of the Commonwealth. These include: a ban on all new Government loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies; a readiness to take unilaterally whatever action may be possible to preclude the import of krugerrand; no Government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa; a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military, police or security forces; a ban—and this is an important provision—on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa; a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa; a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment from South Africa; an embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa; and discouragement of all cultural and scientific events, except where these contribute towards the ending of *apartheid* or at least have no possible role in promoting it.

131. We commend those measures to Member States which have not yet implemented them.

132. It was agreed, moreover, that a group of Commonwealth heads of Government would meet to review the situation in six-months' time, and that if, in their opinion, adequate progress had not been made, they would consider the option of further measures, in addition to those I have mentioned, against South Africa.

133. I wish to reiterate that the Australian Government remains determined to play its part in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in other international bodies such as the Commonwealth, in contributing to effective measures which will, we trust, lead to prompt and peaceful change, to the ending of *apartheid* and to the independence of Namibia.

134. Before concluding, I wish to emphasize that Australia understands fully the special importance African countries attach to the earliest independence of Namibia. Moving and eloquent testimony of this has been given in the Council during our meetings yesterday and earlier today. We understand and sympathize, moreover, with the particular frustrations experienced by SWAPO, which has committed itself to the United Nations plan. The anger, frustration and impatience of African countries are fully shared by the Australian Government.

135. In conclusion, I wish to stress that it is the hope of my delegation that the Council will be able to agree on the text of a firm resolution which will attract unanimous support and which will send yet another clear and strong warning to South Africa.

136. I shall now resume my functions as President of the Council.

137. Before adjourning, I am sure all members of the Council would want me to express, on behalf of the Council, our sympathy to the Government and people of Colombia over the reported widespread and tragic loss of life and extensive damage that appears to have been caused by the eruption of the volcano Nevado del Ruiz.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 52nd meeting.

[2] See A/40/817, annex.

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